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In one perennially troubled corner of Europe, reports of the transatlantic alliance’s death appear premature. All the disputes over tariffs, Ukraine and collective defence are not preventing the US, Europe’s major powers and Nato from acting together to calm a dangerous outbreak of tensions in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
In recent weeks, these tensions have risen to levels rarely seen since the Bosnian war ended in 1995. But the western alliance has swung into action to uphold the US-brokered settlement that, for almost 30 years, has kept a fragile peace in this young, tormented state.
Despite the welcome display of common purpose, there is no room for complacency. The Trump administration has yet to turn its full attention to Bosnia or the Balkans as a whole. Some early signs suggest that, when it does show its hand, it will not be to the Europeans’ liking.
Moreover, Bosnia is just one of an interlocking set of ethnic, territorial and political problems in the Balkans to which there are no simple solutions. Another example is the Serbia-Kosovo dispute. It hardly helps that Russia often stirs the regional pot. The wider the US-European split on Ukraine and other issues, the greater the risk that internal Balkan tensions will combine with external interference to turn the region into a serious security problem for Europe — as it was in the 1990s and 2000s.
For the moment, the US and the Europeans are keeping a lid on the trouble. The latest tensions erupted when a Bosnian high court convicted Milorad Dodik, the Bosnian Serb leader, of defying the rulings of the country’s international high representative. Under the 1995 Dayton settlement, this figure has the job of protecting Bosnia’s unity against extreme nationalists and secessionists, of whom Dodik has been the most egregious since his rise to power in 2010.
After the court sentenced Dodik to a year in jail and imposed a six-year ban on him holding public office, the Bosnian Serb assembly retaliated by barring the pan-Bosnian police and judiciary from Bosnian Serb territory. This move fell short of outright secession, but not by much — as Dodik indicated by telling supporters: “There is no more Bosnia and Herzegovina as of today.”
Then the US, the Europeans and Nato stepped in. Marco Rubio, Trump’s secretary of state, denounced Dodik’s behaviour as “dangerous and destabilising”. European governments echoed Rubio’s condemnation, and the EU said it would increase its peacekeeping force in Bosnia. On Monday, Mark Rutte, Nato’s secretary-general, paid a lightning visit to Sarajevo and warned that the alliance “will not allow a security vacuum to emerge” in Bosnia.
It was an impressive show of western firmness and unity, sharply at odds with the support Russia had expressed for Dodik. Still, the question needs to be asked: for how long will the US and Europe stay on the same page over Bosnia and the wider Balkan region?
One concern is that Rubio and the US state department may turn out not to control America’s Balkan policies — the real drivers could be figures with less formal roles but close personal and political ties with Trump. Among them is Richard Grenell, already named as Trump’s envoy for “special missions”, who in 2023 received a state award from Serbia. Another is Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law, who is involved in real estate deals with the Serbian government. A third is Rod Blagojevich, a former Illinois governor convicted of corruption. Since Trump pardoned him last month, he has been tipped as a possible US ambassador to Belgrade.
The danger is that America will eventually pursue Balkan policies shaped by sympathy with illiberal governments and private business interests. That would destabilise a region with a long record of sucking the rest of Europe into its troubles.
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