Unlock the White House Watch newsletter for free
Your guide to what the 2024 US election means for Washington and the world
This month, many investors feel dazed and confused. No wonder: as the US government flirts with another shutdown and President Donald Trump intensifies his trade war, indices of economic uncertainty have skyrocketed above even the 2020 pandemic or the global financial crisis of 2008.
But the uncertainty could get worse. For amid all the tariff shocks, there is another question hovering: could Trump’s assault on free trade lead to attacks on free capital flows too? Might tariffs on goods be a prelude to tariffs on money?
Until recently, the notion would have seemed crazy. After all, most western economists have long seen capital inflows as a good thing for America, since they have helped to fund its $36tn national debt and business. For instance, Elon Musk, Trump’s adviser, has benefited from Chinese investment, some of which is private.
But some maverick economists, such as Michael Pettis, have long dissented from this orthodox view. Pettis sees these capital inflows as not “just” the inevitable, and beneficial, corollary of America’s trade deficit, but as a debilitating curse. That is because inflows boost the dollar’s value, foster excessive financialisation and hollow out America’s industrial base, he says, meaning that “capital has become the tail that wags the dog of trade”, driving deficits.
Pettis wants curbs, like taxes, therefore. And six years ago, Democratic senator Tammy Baldwin and Josh Hawley, her Republican counterpart, issued a congressional bill, the Competitive Dollar for Jobs and Prosperity Act, which called for taxes on capital inflows and a Federal Reserve weak-dollar policy.
The bill seemed to die. But last month American Compass, a conservative think-tank close to vice-president JD Vance, declared that taxes on capital inflows could raise $2tn over the next decade. Then the White House issued an “America First Investment Policy” executive order that pledged to “review whether to suspend or terminate” a 1984 treaty that, among other things, removed a prior 30 per cent tax on Chinese capital inflows.
This did not grab headlines, since Trump was “flooding the zone” with other distractions, notably on tariffs. But it spooked Asian observers and probably contributed to recent US stock market falls, as some investors preemptively flee.
In reality, a tax shift might not happen — or affect anyone other than the Chinese. Trump is (in)famously mercurial, which makes predicting future policy hard, particularly since his entourage is split into at least three warring factions: nationalist populists (such as Stephen Bannon), techno-libertarians (like Musk) and pro-Maga congressional Republicans. The last two factions might fight capital curbs, due to concerns about destabilising Treasury markets.
But Trump is also eager to use all available tools to bolster his leverage on the world stage. And Pettis’s ideas seem to be influential among some advisers, such as Treasury secretary Scott Bessent, Stephen Miran, the chair of the Council of Economic Advisers, and Vance.
This trio appears minded to reset global trade and finance, via a putative Mar-a-Lago accord, although their ambitions are on a grander scale than the 1985 Plaza accord. The latter “merely” weakened the dollar via joint currency intervention but Miran’s vision of a Mar-a-Lago accord includes a possible US debt restructuring too, which would force some holders of Treasuries to swap them for perpetual bonds.
Some well-connected financial analysts, like Michael McNair, also expect to see a sovereign wealth fund, backed by America’s gold reserves, that would buy non-dollar assets to balance capital inflows (like, say, Greenland’s resources). A third idea is imposing taxes on capital inflows in a wider sense. This might become the preferred approach if the idea of debt swaps leaves rating agencies threatening to downgrade US debt.
“[The trio’s] ultimate goal isn’t a series of bilateral [trade] deals but a fundamental restructuring of the rules governing global trade and finance [to remove] distorted capital flows,” says McNair. “Whether this approach succeeds remains to be seen, but the strategy itself is more coherent and far-reaching than most observers recognise.”
Let me stress that I am not endorsing this, nor predicting with any confidence it truly will happen. And it must be noted that Pettis’s theories provoke outrage among many mainstream economists.
But Pettis is unrepentant. And critics should also note that the 2019 Baldwin-Hawley bill was not only applauded by conservative groups like American Compass, but some union voices too. Since it has populist appeal, it might yet fly.
Either way, the key point to understand is that a shift in economic philosophy is emerging that is potentially as profound as the rethinking unleashed by John Maynard Keynes after the second world war or that pushed by neoliberals in the 1980s. As Greg Jensen of the Bridgewater hedge fund recently quipped, paraphrasing Milton Friedman: “We are all mercantilists now.” Don’t expect that to be reversed any time soon.
Source link
