China’s partnership with Russia needs to have limits

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The writer is senior research fellow on China in the Asia-Pacific Programme at Chatham House

While Europe remains outraged by the Trump administration’s controversial groundwork on ending the war in Ukraine, some officials have questioned whether China might be able to step up its peace brokering efforts. Beijing’s continued approach of cool distance makes it a reticent yet critical potential player in negotiating a ceasefire — but the situation is complex. 

As has been shown by its interventions on the Israel-Hamas conflict, China is keen to raise its stature as a global peacemaker. However, in the case of Ukraine, it seems to want to do this without burdening itself with the substantive responsibility of providing security guarantees.

China enjoys a close relationship with Russia. Weeks prior to Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the two reaffirmed the “no limits” partnership first mentioned by Beijing in 2021. Nato considers China a “decisive enabler” of the Kremlin’s war effort, with Beijing providing critical support to Moscow’s defence industrial base.

This strong inclination to sustain ties with Russia is driven by geographic and strategic necessity. The two countries share a border of 4,300km, almost equivalent to the length of Europe. Beijing’s long rivalry with the US and the American-led world order, heightened by the first Trump administration’s pursuit of a China containment strategy, colours its view of its bond with Moscow. In recent years the two have been able to demonstrate great-power status together on the world stage through joint military exercises and co-ordination within multilateral organisations, counterbalancing US dominance.

Yet, in light of Trump’s sudden U-turn on policy towards Ukraine, Beijing is now worried about a rapid US-Russia rapprochement. While nominally supportive of the “consensus” between Washington and Moscow, closer ties between the two would make Beijing uncomfortable after investing so much both in trade expansion and diplomatic capital in its bilateral relations with Russia. As Moscow’s top trading partner, China wields substantial economic leverage over the Kremlin. It could use this to encourage Russia to accept a ceasefire. Having a voice — albeit a smaller one — in a potential ceasefire deal would not run against China’s interests. It might actually present a confluence of interests with the US.

Beijing’s reluctance to be an active peace broker is also due to its trust deficit with European political elites. Chinese leaders’ several recent trips to Europe were intended to prevent further damage to ties with the continent since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Yet Beijing’s efforts did not go down well with the European audience, most of whom perceive Russia and its allies in black and white terms. The more Beijing tries to explain its relationship with Moscow, it seems, the deeper the mistrust Europe feels towards it. The EU’s talk of “de-risking” in economic terms has added further strains to its relations with Beijing.

China also has to be cautious not to overtly exploit the current breakdown of the transatlantic alliance. Doing so might rattle Trump to press for an even more stringent China containment strategy globally.

Beijing’s limited engagements in brokering peace might not meet expectations from Europe and Ukraine, but it has never been China’s real intention to get involved in the back and forth of negotiations. It can continue to ‘make the right noises’ while navigating a conflicting set of interests, simultaneously responding to Trump’s unorthodox diplomatic strategy coupled with his thinly veiled threats of economic warfare against China.

There are hints that the Chinese leadership may feel conflicted about the Kremlin. Judging from various official statements released since May 2022, Beijing now omits any inclusion of the infamous “no limit” partnership. The quiet removal of this bromance language may indicate a sense of agonising on Beijing’s part about its links to Moscow. Permanent alignment with Putin’s total confrontation with the west may have disastrous consequences for China’s own political economy, but abandoning its biggest nuclear neighbour is equally perilous. Like any relationship — even one ‘without limits’ — Beijing’s ties with Moscow must have boundaries.

China must now strike a delicate balance in its dealings with Russia. It should use the opportunity of ending the war in Ukraine to elevate its status as a world power. But it must also maintain its relationship with Russia — crossing any red lines risks repeating the Sino-Soviet split of 60 years ago.